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Costless and Costly Prosociality: Correspondence among Personality Traits, Economic 
Preferences, and Real World Prosociality  
Abstract 
Prosociality can either be costly (e.g., donating to charity) or costless (e.g. posthumous organ 
donation). Whereas links between personality and costly prosociality and have been explored, 
links with costless prosociality and personality are at present unknown. We address this in 
two studies. Study 1 (N = 200) confirms the distinction between costless and costly 
prosociality based on willingness to engage with health and non-health prosociality. Study 2, 
using data from 4 samples (student and community; N = 733) shows that across incentivized 
and hypothetical economic games to assess costless (generosity game; GG) and costly 
(dictator game; DG) prosociality, that organ donor behavior was linked to greater allocations 
in the GG and charity/volunteering behavior in the DG. Costless and costly prosocialities are 
associated with different personality traits (e.g., costly with politeness and compassion, and 
costless with intellect). Implications for cooperative phenotypes and recruiting organ donors 
are discussed. 
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Costless and Costly Prosociality: Correspondence among Personality Traits, Economic 
Preferences, and Real World Prosociality  
Perceived cost is a key determinant of helping (Stewart-Williams, 2007) with helping 
generally decreasing with increasing costs (Bode, Miller, O’Gorman, & Codling, 2015). 
Studies using economic games or examining real world prosociality have typically focused 
on costly giving such as dictator game allocations, volunteering, and charitable donations 
(Bekkers & Wiepking, 2010; Böckler, Tusche & Singer, 2016). In all of these instances, the 
individual must bear a considerable cost in terms of time, money, or effort in order to assist 
or benefit another person. However, while the vast majority of research into prosociality has 
focused on costly helping, there are prosocial acts that can be considered extremely low cost 
and thus relatively costless and in some case zero-cost, such as posthumous organ donation 
(Moorlock, Ives, & Draper, 2014). Thus, just considering costly helping, in isolation, does 
not provide a complete coverage of the prosocial domain. In the present studies, therefore, we 
examine the distinction between costless and costly prosociality. We firstly explore the factor 
structure of peoples’ willingness to engage in general costless and costly prosociality, and 
then examine the correspondence that costless and costly prosocial preferences in lab-based 
economic games have with real-world prosocial behavior and personality traits.  
Prosociality and Cost 
Some prosocial behaviors are costly because they consume resources that become 
depleted by giving, whereas other prosocial acts are very low-cost/relatively costless, in that 
the giver has sufficient resources to expend without detriment (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), other 
prosocial acts may be zero-cost as the giver longer needs the resource (Moorlock, Ives, & 
Draper, 2014; Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014).  
Examples of real-world costly prosocial acts include charitable giving (which 
involves sacrificing money) and volunteering (which involves sacrificing time) for the benefit 
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of others (Böckler et al., 2016). In the lab, costly prosocial preferences can be assessed using 
the dictator game (DG) (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994), where one player (the 
dictator) decides how to split a fixed amount of money — usually with an anonymous 
recipient — who must accept this unconditionally (Forsythe, et al., 1994). Given the 
constant-sum nature of the game, the dictator has to bear a cost to be prosocial to the 
recipient.  
A classic example of costless real world prosociality is posthumous organ donation 
(Moorlock et al., 2014; Shepherd et al., 2014). Religious or spiritual concerns aside, this act 
is ultimately costless because the donor bears no cost at the time of deciding to donate, and, 
once deceased, is no longer in need of their organs. Within behavioral economics, costless 
prosocial preferences can be explored using the generosity game (GG) (Güth, Levati, & 
Ploner, 2012; Güth, 2010; Zhao, Ferguson, & Smillie, 2016a). Here, one player (the 
proposer) has a fixed amount of money (e.g., $5) to keep, and must decide how much of a 
given range of money (e.g., $0 to $10) another player should receive (see Güth et al., 2012). 
Because the proposer’s own windfall is fixed, the cost of allocating to the recipient is zero — 
the proposer will leave with $5 regardless of what they allocate to the recipient. Research 
shows that most proposers choose to maximize the recipient’s payoff, while a substantial 
portion prefer an equal share to the recipient (Güth et al., 2012; Güth, 2010).  
Aims of the Current Paper 
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate that costless and costly prosociality are 
distinct factors of prosociality. This adds to the existing research that has focused solely on 
the factor structure of costly prosociality (Böckler, Tusche & Singer, 2014; Hubard; 
Harbaugh, Srivastava, Degras & Mayr, 2016; Peysakhovich, Nowak & Rand, 2014). We 
address this aim by: (1) exploring the factor structure of peoples’ willingness to engage in a 
variety of costless and costly prosociality (Study 1), (2) exploring the correspondence 
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between costless and costly real-world and lab-based prosociality (Study 2), and (3) 
examining how these prosocialities are linked with personality (Study 2).  
Study 1: Costless vs. Costly Prosociality in the context of Health vs. Non-Health 
Behaviors 
To study the (zero) costless-costly prosociality distinction we explore the factor 
structure for costless and costly health and non-health based prosociality. Bekkers (2006) 
argues that health and non-health based prosociality are distinct and should be assessed 
separately. Thus, we identify costless and costly aspects of both health and non-health 
prosociality. For example, costless non-health prosociality can be seen in behaviors such as 
‘donating unwanted clothes to charity, signing a petition’ whereas instances of costly non-
health prosociality include ‘donating money to charity’. Costly health prosociality is seen in 
behaviors like blood donation (Lyle et al., 2009), whereas costless health prosociality is seen 
in posthumous organ donation (Shepherd et al., 2014). Thus, we cross costless vs. costly with 
health vs. non-health prosociality to examine whether the costless-costly distinction is 
identifiable.  
Method 
Participants. Two hundred participants (mean age= 24.6, SD = 3.4; 50% male), 
recruited across a UK university campus took part and the sample size is sufficient given the 
number of items to produce a stable factor structure (Ferguson & Cox, 1993) 
Measures. As part of a larger study on motivations and prosociality, participants 
indicated the extent to which they would be willing (from 1 = not at all to 5 = very likely) to 
perform each of 12 behaviors selected to assess archetypal costly and costless prosociality for 
both health and non-health prosocial acts (see Table 2 and Supplementary Files Text S1 and 
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supplementary Tables S1, S2 and, S3 for the rationale for the behaviors included and 
excluded).  
Analysis. We specified a series of confirmatory factor models (CFAs) in Mplus 7, 
using weighted least square with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) to account for the 
ordinal nature of these data. We specified (i) a one factor prosociality model (Model 1); (ii) a 
two factor model with correlated costly and costless factors (Model 2); (iii) a two factor 
model with correlated health and non-health factors (Model 3); (iv) a four factor model with 
orthogonal costly, costless, health and non-health factors (Model 4); and (v) a four factor 
model with the costly and costless factors correlated and the health and non-health factors 
correlated and all other associations orthogonal (Model 5) (see Supplementary Text S1, and 
Table S2 for items and their factor targets). 
Results & Discussion 
Fit statistics for the CFA models are presented in Table 1. While Model 5 is the best 
fit to these data, the pattern of factor loadings suggested a different modified model such that 
blood donation represented a high cost prosociality factor and that low cost prosociality is 
represented by two factors: (1) ‘communal and civic duty’ (e.g., signing a petition, voting, 
registered organ donor and, giving away a car parking ticket and (2) ‘generic non-health 
costless’ prosociality (e.g., giving unwanted clothes or toys to charity or someone a free 
concert ticket) (see Supplementary Text S2 and Table S4 for more detail and the rationale for 
the revised model). This modified model was specified and is referred to as Model 6 in Table 
2. This model is both a good fit to these data with an interpretable structure (Table 2). 
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Table 1. CFA Model Fit Statistics 
Models χ 2 (df) CFI TLI RMSEA 
Model 1: One factor 311.06 (54)*** .59 .49 .15*** 
Model 2: Two factors (costly vs costless)  255.85 (53)*** .72 .65 .13*** 
Model 3: Two factors (health vs non-health)  226.70 (53)*** .72 .65 .13*** 
Model 4: Four factors (health vs non-health, 
costly vs costless) – all orthogonal 
106.14 (42)*** .90 .84 .09*** 
Model 5: Four factors (health vs non-health, 
costly vs costless) - health vs non-health, 
costly vs costless – oblique 
66.41 (40)*** .96 .93 .06 
Modified Modelling     
Model 6: Four-factor – Costless (genetic or 
communal/civic) and Costly (health or non-
health) 
74.97(48)** .96 .94 .05 
Note. ** p < .01, *** p < 001. CFI = Comparative Ft Index, TLI – Tucker-Lewis Index, 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
In Model 6, there are two types of costless prosociality, one focused on communal 
and civic duty (Factor 4) that includes organ donation, the other being a generic non-health 
costless prosociality (Factor 1). Similarly, costly prosociality is split into health (Factor 3), 
focusing on blood donation, versus general non-health behaviors (Factor 2). We conducted a 
sensitivity analysis that showed that this factor structure was not influenced by our strict item 
exclusion criteria concerning living organ donation (Supplementary Text S3, Table S5).  
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Table 2. CFA factor loadings and Latent factor inter-correlations for Model 6 
Behaviors 
Factors 
1 2 3 4 
Donate your unwanted clothes to charity .913 . 000 . 000 . 000 
Give someone a concert ticket for free that you can no longer 
use 
.554 . 000 . 000 . 000 
Donate any unwanted toys to charity .690 . 000 . 000 . 000 
Donating 20% of your salary to charity . 000 .617 . 000 . 000 
Donate money to help those you think have unfairly lost their 
jobs 
. 000 .780 . 000 .000 
Volunteer your time regularly to help out at a local charity 
shop 
. 000 .377 . 000 .000 
Donate blood once .000 .000 .806 . 000 
Donate blood regularly . 000 . 000 .831 . 000 
Give someone your car parking ticket, for free, when there is 
still time left on it 
. 000 . 000 . 000 .604 
Register as an organ donor to donate organs after your death .000 . 000 . 000 .553 
Sign a petition . 000 .000 . 000 .658 
Vote in a general election . 000 .000 . 000 .672 
Correlations across latent factors  
  Factor 1: Costless Non-Health Prosociality 1    
  Factor 2: Costly Non-Health Prosociality .381 1   
  Factor 3: Costly Health Prosociality: Blood Donation .278 .116 1  
  Factor 4: Costless Communal and Civic Duty .521 -.063 .415 1 
 
Note. Coefficients in bold indicate significant loadings and significant inter-correlations.  
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Study 2: Correspondence Between Real World and Lab-Based Prosociality 
Study 1 demonstrates a clear distinction between costless and costly prosociality. 
Here we move beyond self-reports and examine the correspondence between an archetypal 
costless behavior – posthumous organ donation – and allocations in the generosity game 
(GG: a costless behavioural preference). We also examine the correspondence between 
archetypal costly behaviours – donating to charity and volunteering – and allocations in the 
dictator game (DG: a costly behavioral preference). We choose to explore organ donation as 
an example of costless prosociality as it is endorsed by a large number within the population, 
whereas numbers of people giving unwanted clothes to charity, for example, is not clearly 
measured or known (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2016). Furthermore,  
organ donation reflects aspects of non-health costless prosociality (see Table 2 above) and 
thus has generalizability beyond the health domain. 
Our predictions are based on self-perception theory from psychology (Bem, 1972; 
Baumeister, 1998) and self-image models from economics (Benabou & Tirole, 2006: see also 
Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 2013). These suggest that people’s prosocial behaviors reflect, to an 
extent, their underlying values and people act in a manner consistent with these (see also 
Yamagishi, Horita, Takagishi, Shinda, Tanida & Cook, 2009). Thus, we predict that those 
who identify as an organ donor will allocate more to a partner in the GG (but not the DG) as 
this will be consistent with them being a generous person who gives when there are no real 
costs. On the other hand, those who engage in donating to charity and volunteering will 
allocate more to a partner when it comes to costly giving in the DG (but not the GG) as again 
this is more consistent with their self-image as a person who gives when it is costly.  
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Links with Personality 
There is a growing literature showing how personality traits predict giving in the real-
world and prosocial preferences within economic games (Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Based on 
this literature we offer a number of predictions about how costless and costly prosociality will 
differ with respect to the aspects of the Five-Factor Model of personality. This consists of 
five broad trait domains (i.e., neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
openness/intellect), each of which subsumes two narrower traits (known as aspects) which 
reflect distinct but correlated tendencies (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; DeYoung, 
2013). The five factor domains and their aspects are detailed in Table 3. Examining the trait 
predictors of costly versus costless prosociality at this finer-grained level of personality may 
shed light on some of the psychological mechanisms underpinning each different form of 
prosociality.  
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Table 3. Aspects of the Big Five model of personality, from the Big Five Aspect Scales 
(BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). 
 Description Example item α 
Neuroticism    
 Withdrawal Tendency to experience anxious 
and depressive traits 
Seldom feel blue .88 
 Volatility Tendency to be irritated, angry, 
and emotionally labile 
Get angry easily .90 
Agreeableness    
 Politeness Tendency to respect others and 
adhere to social norms 
Hate to seem pushy .78 
 Compassion Tendency to be emotionally 
concerned about others’ 
wellbeing 
Sympathize with 
others’ feelings 
.90 
Conscientiousness    
 Industriousness Tendency to be focused on goal 
pursuit and carry out plans 
Finish what I start .87 
 Orderliness Tendency to be rule-abiding and 
organised 
Follow a schedule .81 
Extraversion    
 Enthusiasm Tendency to be gregarious and to 
experience positive emotions 
Warm up quickly to 
others 
.88 
 Assertiveness Tendency to be bold and 
dominant 
Take charge .91 
Openness/Intellect    
 Openness Tendency for engagement with 
perceptual and aesthetic domains 
Enjoy the beauty of 
nature 
.82 
 Intellect Tendency for intellectual 
curiosity and engagement 
Like to solve 
complex problems 
.88 
Note. Cronbach’s α are calculated from the combined samples of the current study (N = 733). 
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For example, previous research indicates that allocations in the standard DG (costly 
helping) are predicted by politeness (Zhao, Ferguson & Smillie, 2016b). However, both 
politeness and compassion (the tendency to be emotionally concerned for others) aspects of 
agreeableness are linked to DG allocations when these are framed within real world contexts 
of need and equity (Zhao, Ferguson, & Smillie, 2016c). In accordance with this, we expect 
that indices of costly prosociality should be linked to both politeness and compassion (Zhao, 
Ferguson & Smillie, 2016 b, c). Conscientiousness has also been linked to costly effortful 
real-world prosociality in terms of predicting the frequency of repeat blood donation 
(Ferguson, 2004). Thus, we expect that the industriousness aspect of conscientiousness, as 
this specifically reflects effort in pursuit of a goal, should be positively linked to costly 
prosociality. On the other hand, as costless prosociality reflects no real cost to the individual 
it may be driven more by norm adherence (i.e., to “do good”) and linked, therefore, more to 
politeness than compassion. However, at present there are no data on which to make specific 
predictions regarding costless prosociality and as such this is a more exploratory aspect of the 
current paper, and should, therefore, add new and novel findings to the literature. 
Method 
 Samples. We tested our predictions across 4 samples drawn from both predominantly 
Australian student (Samples 1 and 3, hereafter referred to as “students”) and US community 
(Samples 2 and 4, hereafter referred to as “MTurk”) populations. Australian students were 
recruited from online advertisements and flyers posted around the University of Melbourne, 
Australia, and completed the study for monetary payment or course credit. US community 
members (US residents) were recruited from the online marketplace, Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) and completed the study online for monetary payment. The final overall N was 
733. The mean age of the samples ranged from 19.63 (Sample 3) to 34.8 (Sample 4) years. 
Table 4 presents further details of each sample. This greatly exceeds our minimum target 
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sample size of at least 175 participants, which provides 80% power to identify an effect sizes 
of r = .21 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), which is in line with previous findings 
for the role of agreeableness in dictator games (Zhao et al., 2016). The greater sample size 
allows us to control for sample differences and to explore the role of sex and different game 
structures (e.g., incentivization).
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Table 4. Summary of Samples in Study 2 
 Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3  Sample 4  
Final N 70 304 103 256 
Number (%) removed 
after comprehension 
and/or attention checks 
33 (32%); four 
comprehension checks of 
games and one of two 
attention checks 
embedded within 
personality measures 
26 (7.9%); two attention 
checks embedded within 
personality measures 
19 (15.6%); two attention 
checks embedded within 
personality measures 
10 (3.8%); two attention 
checks embedded within 
personality measures 
Participants University students and 
community members in 
Australia 
US Amazon MTurk 
workers (with fewer than 
50 Human Intelligence 
Tasks) 
First-year psychology 
students at an Australian 
university 
US Amazon MTurk 
workers 
Age 18–33 years (Mage = 
22.34, SD = 3.76) 
18–65 years (Mage = 
30.90, SD = 9.89) 
18–47 years (Mage = 
19.63, SD = 3.71) 
19–67 years (Mage = 
34.76, SD = 11.00) 
% female 65.7% 54.9% 75.7% 42.6% 
% organ donor 25.7% 66.8% 29.1% 53.5% 
Administration of study 
 
 
Online Qualtrics survey Online Qualtrics survey Online Qualtrics survey Online Qualtrics survey 
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 Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3  Sample 4  
Median study time 64 minutes 30 minutes 43 minutes 42 minutes 
Show-up fee AUD15.00 USD2.00 Course credit USD8.00 
Game format Full description of dictator 
and generosity game 
Decomposed: dictator and 
generosity games 
embedded within a series 
of different decomposed 
economic allocation 
decisions 
Decomposed: dictator and 
generosity games 
embedded within a series 
of different decomposed 
economic allocation 
decisions 
Decomposed: dictator and 
generosity games 
embedded within a series 
of different decomposed 
economic allocation 
decisions 
Incentivisation Incentivized: participants 
played a number of 
economic games in which 
they were matched with 
another player, and one of 
these games was selected 
for payment at the rate of 
1 point = AUD1.00 
 
 
 
 
Hypothetical: participants 
asked to imagine that they 
were playing with a 
stranger that they would 
not knowingly meet 
Hypothetical: participants 
asked to imagine that they 
were playing with a 
stranger that they would 
not knowingly meet 
Incentivized: participants 
played a number of 
economic games in which 
they were matched with 
another player, and one of 
these games was selected 
for payment at the rate of 
1 point = USD0.10 
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Sample 1  
 
Sample 2  
 
Sample 3  
 
Sample 4  
Economic games in 
study 
Dictator game, ultimatum 
game (proposer), 
ultimatum game 
(responder), and 
generosity game. 
Participants were 
randomly assigned to one 
of four different orders of 
these games based on a 
Latin Squares design. 
 
The order of the games 
was not associated with 
responses in the dictator 
and generosity games. 
Real-world dictator game, 
dictator game, and 
generosity game (the latter 
two were randomized). 
 
 
 
 
 
Experimental condition 
for the real-world dictator 
game was not associated 
with responses in the later 
dictator and generosity 
games. 
Giving/taking framed 
dictator game, social 
mindfulness task, dictator 
game, and generosity 
game (the latter two were 
randomized). 
 
 
 
Giving/taking framing of 
the earlier dictator game 
was not associated with 
responses in the later 
dictator and generosity 
games. 
Giving/taking framed 
dictator game, dictator 
game, followed by 
generosity game. 
 
 
 
 
 
Giving/taking framing of 
the earlier dictator game 
was not associated with 
responses in the later 
dictator and generosity 
games. 
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Materials 
Economic Games 
Dictator Game. In the DG, participants indicated their preferred choice out of 11 
different payoff combinations that varied in one monetary unit (MU) increments (1 MU = 1 
AUD in Sample 1, 1 MU = 0.10 USD in Sample 4, and 1 MU = 1 hypothetical dollar in 
Samples 2 and 3). For example, in Sample 1 the 11 different payoff combinations ranged 
from $0 for oneself and $10 for one’s partner (scored 10) to $10 for oneself and $0 for one’s 
partner (scored 0), varying in $1 increments. While stake sizes vary, the evidence shows that 
this has no systematic effect on behavioral responses (Raihani, Mace & Lamba, 2013). 
Generosity Game. In the GGs (Güth et al., 2012; Güth, 2010), participants were 
again asked to indicate their preferred selection out of 11 different payoff combinations. 
These involved the same MUs and conversion rates as those in the DG. This time, their own 
payoff was always fixed at 5 MUs and the choices ranged from 0 MU (scored 0) to 10 MUs 
(scored 10) for their partner, varying in 1 MU increments. Although this game was based on 
the original paradigms of the same name developed by Güth et al. (2012) and Güth (2010), 
there is one crucial difference. Participants directly selected their partner’s payoffs (e.g., 0–10 
MUs) rather than the total size of the combined payoffs, which was implemented to allow 
comparability with the format of the dictator game responses (see Supplementary Text S4 for 
full instructions for the DG and GG). 
Incentivized and Hypothetical Versions: As there is some evidence that 
incentivized economic games magnify trait effects in prosocial behavior (Zhao, Ferguson, & 
Smillie, 2016a) we administered the games both as hypothetical scenarios with imagined 
partners (Samples 2 and 3) and incentivized games with real partners and stakes (Samples 1 
and 4). In the incentivised games, participants were informed that their decisions would be 
matched to another participant and that their earnings from one of the games would be 
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selected for payment at the end of the session. Game payoffs were represented by points that 
corresponded with real dollar amounts that were paid at the end of the study using 
participants’ anonymous response identification codes (see Table 1 for details). Participants 
playing hypothetical versions of these games were asked to imagine that they were playing 
the games with an anonymous partner who was described as another participant that they 
would not knowingly meet. 
Expressed Real-World Prosociality 
To measure costless real-world prosociality, we asked all participants: “Are you an 
organ donor?” (Yes/ No). This was adapted from questions used to assess blood donor 
behavior (Ferguson et al., 2012). 
To measure costly real-world prosociality, we asked and summed responses to two 
questions: (1) How often have you donated to charity in the past year? And (2) How often 
have you been involved in any form of volunteer work in the past year? Both were responded 
to using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 0 times, 2 = 1-2 times, 3 = 3-5 times, 4 = 6-10 times, and 
5 = more than 10 times; inter-item correlation = .34). These were also adapted from previous 
work concerning general charity/volunteer identity (Ferguson et al., 2012). 
Personality measure: Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007) 
Participants completed the 100-item BFAS, a widely-used and well-validated measure 
of the five broad domains of personality and each of their two lower-level aspects. These 
were each measured with 10 items per aspect, to which participants responded using a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Table 1 provides the alpha 
coefficients, indicating that the scales were all reliable. Data on the HEXACO model were 
also collected but not analyzed here as our hypotheses derive directly from previous work on 
the BFAS. 
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Procedure 
All participants completed the DG and GG as part of a larger set of economic games 
(see Table 4; the order and number of games completed did not affect performance on either 
the DGs and GGs), and also indicated whether or not they were an organ donor, as well as the 
extent to which they had donated to charity and volunteered. 
Statistical Analysis 
 DG and GG responses were not skewed, but response options were left and right 
censored. Therefore, we applied OLS as well as Tobit models to account for the left and right 
censoring. We explored for consensus across analytic strategies to ensure findings were not 
sensitive to the nature of the DG and GG distributions. As these games show consistent sex 
effects (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001), sex was also included in all models. We initially 
conducted our analyses aggregating these data across all 4 samples, and sample (student vs. 
MTurk) and incentivization (incentivized vs. hypothetical) dummies, as well as their 
interaction, were included to control for sample differences. To control for any consistent 
prosocial preference across DG and GG allocations, DG allocations were included as a 
covariate in the GG model and vice versa.  
Results & Discussion 
 Table 4 indicates the percentage of participants who expressed being an organ donor, 
with 66.8% and 53.5% in the US MTurk samples and 25.7% and 29.1% in Australian student 
samples. At present, 54% of the US population have registered as an organ donor (US 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2016) with a corresponding percentage of 22% in 
Australia who have registered their intent to donate (Department of Human Services, 2017). 
Thus, the figures reported in the samples are generally consistent with their nationally 
representative figures. 
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Tables 5a and b shows the regression models for the aggregated data for the 
generosity and dictator games respectively. Organ donors vs. non-donors, allocated more to 
their partner in the GG (means: 7.0 MUs to the partner vs. 6.2 MUs to the partner: Tobit 
regression B = 1.45, (95%CI = 0.76, 2.12) t = 4.17, p = .000; Table 3a), but organ donor 
status was unrelated to DG allocations (means: 4.0 MUs to the partner vs. 3.8 MUs to the 
partner; Tobit regression B = -0.06, (95%CI = -0.40, 0.28) t = -0.36, p = .722; Table 3b). 
Conversely, expressed levels of charity/volunteer prosociality were significantly associated 
with DG allocations (Tobit regression B = 0.11, (95%CI = 0.03, 0.19) t = 2.82, p = .005; 
Table 3b), but showed no significant association with GG allocations (Tobit regression B = 
0.09, (95%CI = -0.07, 0.25) t = 1.09, p = .277; Table 3a). While this pattern is generally seen 
across all 4 sample there are a few variations that are discussed in Supplementary Text S5 
and Tables S6 and S7).  
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Table 5a. Regression Models Predicting Generosity Game Allocations 
 ρ OLS 95%CI Tobit 95%CI 
Organ Donation (0= no, 1 = yes) .15*** 0.85*** 0.44, 1.26 1.45*** 0.76, 2.12 
Charity/Volunteer .03 0.05 -0.04, 0.15 0.09 -0.07, 0.25 
Sex (1 = male, 2= female,) -.19*** -0.93*** -1.33, -0.52 -1.58*** -2.26, -0.91 
Incentives (Incentivized = 1, = 
hypothetical = 2) 
-.16*** -1.69*** -2.55, -0.84 -2.79*** -4.23, -1.34 
Sample (0= Student, 1 = MTurk) .06 -2.00* -3.56, -0.44 -1.42* -2.69, -
0.125 
Dictator Game -.11** -0.02 -0.13, 0.09 0.09 -0.28, 0.08 
Generosity Game      
Incentives*Sample  1.21* 0.27, 2.14 1.97* 0.39, 3.55 
     95%CI 
R2  .08***  .02 0.76, 2.12 
N  728  728  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; ρ = Spearman’s Rho
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Table 5b. Regression Models Predicting Dictator Game Allocations 
 ρ OLS 95%CI Tobit 95%CI 
Organ Donation (0= no, 1 = yes) .05 -0.06 -0.34, 0.22 -0.06 -0.40, 0.27 
Charity/Volunteer .13** 0.10** 0.03, 0.16 0.11** 0.03, 0.19 
Sex (1 = male, 2= female,) .14** 0.33* 0.06, 0.61 0.41* 0.07, 0.74 
Incentives (Incentivized = 1, = 
hypothetical = 2) 
.40*** 2.32*** 1.76, 2.88 2.69*** 2.01, 3.38 
Sample (0= Student, 1 = MTurk) .05 1.94** 0.88, 2.99 1.04** 0.43, 1.65 
Dictator Game      
Generosity Game -.11** -0.01 -0.06, 0.04 -0.01 -0.07, 0.04 
Incentives*Sample  -1.02** -1.65, -0.38 -1.13** -1.91, -0.36 
      
R2  .19***  .05  
N 729-732 728  728  
Note., * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; ρ = Spearman’s Rho 
Structure of Costless and Costly Prosociality. To replicate the findings from Study 
1 we explore if indices for costly and costless prosociality (both preferences and expressed 
real world prosociality) load on distinct components.  We ran a CFA where, to reflect their 
distributions, we specified the DG allocations as censored on lower values and the GG 
allocations on higher values, the remaining variables were specified as categorical and we 
used a WLSMV estimator. We also specified a complex survey design and clustered within 
samples. The CFA fits were excellent (χ 2  = 4.45 (df = 4), p = .35; CFI = .99, TLI = .98, 
RMSEA = .01). The analysis confirm a costly and costless two-factor structure.  
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Table 6. CFA for Costless and Costly Prosociality 
Prosociality 
Measures 
Costly Helping Costless Helping 
Charity .99 .00 
Volunteering .39 .00 
Dictator Game .16 .00 
Generosity Game .00 .76 
Organ Donation .00 .26 
Eigenvalues   
% variance   
 Latent Correlations 
 1  
.26 1 
Note. Coefficients in bold indicate the significant associations and loadings  
 
Relations with Personality. We summed the two factors for costly and costless 
prosociality and regressed (OLS) these onto the 10 aspects of personality, controlling for sex, 
incentivisation (incentivized game vs. hypothetical scenario), sample type (student vs. 
MTurk), and the incentivisation by sample interaction (Table 7). These results show that 
costly prosociality is positively associated with the politeness (β = .13; p = .009) and 
compassion (β = .18 p = .001) aspects of agreeableness, and the assertiveness aspect of 
extraversion (β = .15 p = .010). Conversely, costless helping was positively associated with 
the politeness (β = .14 p = .004) aspect of agreeableness and the intellect aspect of 
openness/intellect (β = .25 p = .009, and negatively associated with the industriousness aspect 
of conscientiousness (β = -.15 p = .017). Both costly and costless prosociality are, therefore, 
related to good manners and following social norms. However, costly and costless 
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prosociality can be differentiated in that the former involves empathy, compassion, and social 
boldness, whereas the latter involves greater intellectual engagement and reduced behavioral 
effort. 
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Table 7. Ordinary Least Squares Regression for Costless and Costly Prosociality  
  Costly   Costless  
Predictor β B 95%CI β B 95%CI 
N-Withdrawal -.10 -0.37 -0.83, 0.09 -.06 -0.22 -0.67, 0.24 
N-Volatility .02 0.09 -0.31, 0.49 -.01 -0.05 -0.45, 0.35 
A-Compassion .18** 0.85** 0.37, 1.33 -.01 -0.06 -0.53, 0.42 
A-Politeness .13*** 0.68*** 0.17, 1.19 .14** 0.74** 0.24, 1.24 
C-Industriousness -.05 -0.23 -0.74, 0.28 -.15* -0.61* -1.12, -0.11 
C-Orderliness .03 0.16 -0.25, 0.57 -.04 -0.17 -0.57, 0.23 
E-Enthusiasm -.08 -0.34 -0.76, 0.08 .01 0.05 -0.36, 0.46 
E-Assertiveness .15** 0.58** 0.14, 1.02 -.08 -0.30 -0.73, 0.13 
O-Intellect -.01 -0.01 -0.45, 0.44 .25*** 1.07*** 0.63, 1.51 
O-Openness .01 0.04 -0.36, 0.45 -.08 -0.39 -0.78, 0.01 
Gender (1 = male, 2= 
female,) 
.13*** 0.76*** 0.31, 1.21 -.14*** -0.83*** -1.28, -0.38 
Incentives (Incentivized = 
1, = hypothetical = 2) 
.24*** 1.45*** 0.58, 2.31 -.32*** -1.87*** -2.72, -1.03 
Sample (0 = Student, 1 = 
MTurk) 
.05 0.38 -1.25, 2.01 -.30* -2.00* -3.61, -0.40 
Incentives* Sample -0.04 -0.14 -1.13, 0.85 .40** 1.47** 0.50, 2.44 
N   728   729  
R2  .17   .12  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. N = Neuroticism, A = Agreeableness, C = 
Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, O = Openness/Intellect. B coefficients are unstandardized and β 
standardized.
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Effects of Sex, Incentives and Sample. The analysis also revealed a number of 
interesting effects for sex, incentivization, and sample type (i.e., women showed greater 
costly prosociality than men, while this was reversed for costless prosociality; incentivization 
increased costless prosociality but reduced costly prosociality). As these were not the focus of 
this study they are detailed in the supplementary materials (Supplementary Text S6, Figure 
S1) for the interested reader.  
General Discussion 
Taken together, the present studies yielded a clear, important, and novel, finding: 
Costly prosociality can be distinguished from costless prosociality in both lab-based 
economic games and real-world prosocial behaviors, and these two forms of prosociality 
show diverging relations with personality characteristics. Thus, considering only costly 
prosociality, in isolation, does not provide a complete analysis of the prosocial domain. 
Distinguishing Costly and Costless Prosociality 
While Böckler, Tusche and Singer (2014) report a multidimensional structure for 
prosociality, based on both self-report and behavioral data, there is growing evidence, based 
on behavioral (Brocklebank, Lewis & Bates, 2011; Peysakhovich, Nowak & Rand, 2014; 
Yamagishi, Mifune, Li, Shinda, Hashimoto, Horita, Miura, Inukai, Tanida, Kiyonari, 
Takagishi & Simunovic, 2013) as well as a mixture of self-report and behavioral data 
(Hubard; Harbaugh, Srivastava, Degras & Mayr, 2016), supporting the existence of a general 
prosocial/cooperative phenotype. Indeed, Wilhelm, Kaltwasser and Hilderbrandt (2017) raise 
a number of conceptual and statistical concerns with the Böckler, Tusche and Singer (2014)  
analyses and identified a single factor underlying prosociality in their re-analysis (however 
see Böckler, Tusche &  Singer, 2018 for a reply). 
However, all of this this evidence is based on tasks that are costly. The costless vs. 
costly dichotomy demonstrated here has not been modelled with respect to the prosocial 
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phenotype and our results suggest that there may be at least two distinct prosocial phenotypes 
— costly and costless. This requires further study with a wider array of preferences and real-
world prosociality. 
 To support this further we see that the costly prosociality is associated with 
personality traits reflecting politeness and compassion, the two aspects of Big Five 
agreeableness. Previous research examining the DG shows that when this is decontextualized 
– as used here –politeness, rather than compassion is the main predictor (Zhao et al., 2016b). 
However, compassion becomes a predictor of DG allocations when these are contextualized 
in terms of norms of need and equity (Zhao et al., 2016c). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the costly prosociality component that contains both decontextualized and contextualized 
prosociality is associated with both compassion and politeness. Thus, costly prosociality may 
be motivated both by adherence to social norms as well as by emotional concern for others.  
Interestingly costless prosociality is distinguished by its association with intellect. 
With respect to organ donor registration, for example, there is some evidence that this is 
linked to knowledge, education, and thoughtfulness (Sperling & Gurman, 2012; Saleem et al., 
2009). As such, this may, in part, account for the association of the intellect aspect of 
openness with costless prosociality. Thus, while it might still be normative to help, helping 
here may be more considered and thought through. This suggests that costless helping may be 
more dependent than costly helping on processes connected with cognitive engagement, such 
reasoning and reflection, than compassion and empathy. Indeed, this may also reflect a 
utilitarian principle in which utility is maximised for all with as little wastage as possible. 
 In contrast to our predictions, costly prosociality was not associated with increased 
effort (as indexed by the industriousness aspect of conscientiousness), but rather costless 
prosociality was linked to reduced industriousness. While this is an unpredicted finding and 
warrants further attention, in this context it appears that it is the absence of expenditure of 
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energy, effort and resources which underlie costless prosociality. Finally, we show that the 
assertiveness aspect of extraversion was positively associated with costly helping. It has 
previously been shown that other measures of assertiveness positively predict costly 
punishment (negative reciprocity) with respect to rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum 
game (Yamagishi, Horita, Mifune, Hashimoto, Li, Shinadad, M., Miura, Inukai., Takagishi., 
& Simunovic, 2012; Kaltwasser, Hilderbrandt, Whilhelm, & Sommer, 2016), which has been 
interpreted in terms of status protection. However, in the context of costly prosociality 
without punishment, as studied here, this may specifically reflect the social, leadership, and 
agentic elements of volunteer behavior. 
Applications 
Lab-Field Correspondence There is a growing literature on the capacity of lab based 
prosocial preferences to predict real-world behaviors (Ostrom, 2006). In this paper economic 
preferences corresponded well with instances of real-world prosociality with a theoretically 
meaningful distinction based on costliness. One implication of our results is to identify 
correspondence between prosocial preferences in economic games and real-world 
prosociality. Here we focused on costly versus costless prosociality. Ferguson and colleagues 
(Ferguson et al., 2012) focused on warm-glow preference with respect to blood donation, and 
Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) on social cooperation, as indexed by PGG allocations, and 
variation in use of fishing techniques there were more or less likely to preserve stocks. In all 
these cases the correspondence was good. When the correspondence is less clear the 
associations are generally lower (Voors, Turley, Kontoleon, Bulte, & List, 2012). Thus, a 
clear matching of the motivations of real-world prosociality and lab-based preferences is 
needed.  
 Interventions for Organ Donation. The present findings offer potential implications 
for encouraging organ donation: Internationally, there is a major shortage of donor organs to 
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meet the demand for transplantation. By way of example, in August 2016 there were 120,000 
people in the US and over 7,000 people on the UK waiting list for a solid organ transplant. 
Advances in transplant surgery and immunosuppression mean that outcomes following a 
solid organ transplant are excellent. We know from the GG results that the organ donors 
actually are hyper generous, endowing their partners with more wealth than themselves. Thus 
organ donors who start from a position of relative advantage and are motivated, not just to 
redress that initial inequality, but over-compensate. This initial inequality may trigger an 
‘advantageous inequality aversion’ (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) whereby they are motivated by 
guilt to reduce it, resulting in a ‘dis-advantageous inequality aversion’ whereby the partner is 
now better off. This pattern reflects exactly what is observed in an organ donation context. 
Initially the donor is healthy and the recipient unhealthy (advantageous inequality aversion 
from the perspective of the donor) and after donation the recipient is healthy and the donor 
deceased (dis-advantageous inequality aversion from the perspective of the donor). Applied 
to the donor domain, this equates to motivating the healthy organ donors to help another 
whose health is poor. Thus, the following appeal, “Being fit and healthy to give organs after 
your death means you have the ability to help those less healthy than you have a better life”, 
is worthy of rigorous evaluation. 
Conclusion. Costliness is a major determinant of prosocial behavior, yet previous 
research has largely focused on costly prosociality both in the lab (e.g., giving to an 
anonymous partner in dictator games) and self-reported real-world behaviors (e.g., charitable 
giving and volunteering). In the current study, we identified distinct components of costly 
and costless prosociality (across self-reports and economic games) that were driven by 
different personality traits, and are likely to reflect different motivations. This distinction 
highlights the multifaceted nature of prosociality and has important implications for how 
different types of prosocial behaviors can be promoted in the real-world. 
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Data Access: The data can be obtained from either the 1st author on request or from uploaded 
files as supplementary associated with this paper on OSF web-pages. 
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Supplementary Files 
Supplementary Text S1: Item Selection for Costless and Costly 
Helping Behaviors in Study 1 
Study 1 was part of a larger study that explored a wide variety of 21 helping 
behaviors, in which 12 key indicators of costless and costly helping were embedded. These 
12 behaviors are detailed in Table S1 below, which also details how they relate to the two 
dimensions of costly-costlessness and health-non-health prosociality.  
Defining Altruistic Helping/Prosociality 
We define altruistic helping/prosociality as behaviors performed by one individual to 
benefit another unknown individual, group or society (Ma, Tunney, & Ferguson, 2017; 
Nowak, 2006). We focus on unknown recipients as this is central to the archetypal definition 
of altruistic helping that does not include effects of kin-selection and inclusive fitness 
(whereby the helper shows a preferential pattern of helping towards those related to them; 
Nowak, 2006). The extent to which helper and recipient are genetically related, as well as 
socially related, will influence how costs are calculated and as such introduces an additional 
dimension (genetic relatedness) to the analyses. We felt as an initial step in the investigation 
of costly and costless helping we would restrict our analyses to helping strangers. Our 
definition of helping does not include cost directly, as we suggest that, in fact, there can be 
altruistic helping toward a stranger where cost is not involved. 
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Items to Assesses Costless Prosociality. 
Specifically we define costless prosociality when the giver has sufficient resources to 
expend without detriment (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), and zero-cost prosociality when the giver 
no longer needs the resources and can, therefore, give it at zero-cost (Moorlock, Ives, & 
Draper, 2014; Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014). Thus, gifting unwanted or unneeded 
goods is seen to define zero-cost/costless prosocial acts (Moorlock, Ives, & Draper, 2014; 
Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014). Thus, behaviors that focused on costless helping 
were constructed such that each item indicated that the resources gifted were no longer 
‘wanted’, ‘needed’ or ‘useful’ (e.g. ‘Donate your unwanted clothes to charity’, ‘register as an 
organ donor to donate organs after your death’) or incurred no direct cost to immediate 
resources of the individual but may help large groups of people (e.g., voting). These 
behaviors were also designed to be a generic class of costless behaviors (e.g., ‘Donate your 
unwanted clothes to charity’) that most people will have done or are likely to do, as we feel 
that this adds to the generalizability of the findings. As registering as an organ donor after 
death has been highlighted as an archetypal costless health behaviour, it was used as our 
primary index of zero-cost/costless health based prosociality (Moorlock, Ives, & Draper, 
2014; Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014).  
Items to Assess Costly Prosociality Helping. 
The costly prosociality items were specified such that the cost to the helper was made 
clear in terms of money, effort, and time. These again were generic archetypal behaviors 
such a volunteering, donating money from a person’s salary (e.g., Donating 20% of your 
salary to charity), contributing to compensate injustices (‘Donate money to help those you 
think have unfairly lost their jobs’). Blood donation was chosen as the classic example of a 
costly prosocial health behavior (Lyle et al, 2009) and acts that involved donating time, effort 
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and resources that can be depleted as classic examples of costly non-health prosociality (see 
Tables S1 & S2). 
Defining Prosocial Health and Non-Health Behaviors. 
The prosocial health behaviors were defined as those that had a direct benefit to 
another person’s health (e.g., blood donation). The non-health behaviors were general daily 
acts that had no health implications for any party involved. 
Table S1. Key Costly-Costless and Health-Non-health Prosocial Behaviors  
 Cost Focus 
Donating 20% of your salary to charity Costly Non-Health 
Donate money to help those you think have unfairly lost their jobs Costly Non-Health 
Volunteer your time regularly to help out at a local charity shop Costly Non-Health 
Donate blood once Costly Health 
Donate blood regularly Costly Health 
Register as an organ donor to donate organs after your death Costless Health 
Give someone your car parking ticket, for free, when there is still time left on it Costless Non-Health 
Sign a petition Costless Non-Health 
Vote in a general election Costless Non-Health 
Donate your unwanted clothes to charity Costless Non-Health 
Give someone a concert ticket for free that you can no longer use Costless Non-Health 
Donate any unwanted toys to charity Costless Non-Health 
To ensure that these 12 target costly and costless prosocial behaviors conformed to 
our specification we ran a small pilot study where we asked 15 participants (mean age = 
31.73; SD = 13.45) to rate the 12 behaviors in Table S1 that are used in Study 1 in terms of 
cost with respect to time, money, effort, and emotional impact.  Time, money, and effort are 
standardly used in the literature to index cost. We also included emotional impact to index 
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psychological cost. We thus created two aggregate scores of cost one based in time, money 
and effort (traditional cost index) and one to include all 4 (augmented cost index). 
Participants used the following scales to make the ratings: 
Time = How much of your time would you need to spend to do each behaviour (where: 0 = 
no time at all, is essentially something that can be done very quickly, 1 = very little time, 2 
a small amount of time, 3 = some time, 4 = a lot of time, 5 = very time consuming, 6 = 
extremely time consuming) 
Money = How much money would it cost you to do each of behaviour (where: 0 = no money 
at all it is essentially a free act, 1 = a very small amount of money, 2 a small amount of 
money, 3 = some money, 4 a lot of money, 5 = expensive, 6 = very expensive)  
Effort = How much effort (physical and mental effort) would you need to spend to do each 
behaviour (where: 0 = no work at all, is essentially something that can be done easily, 1 = a 
very small amount of effort, 2 a small amount of effort, 3 = some effort, 4 = a lot of effort, 
5 = very hard work, 6 = extremely hard work) 
Emotional = How emotionally hard would you find it to do each behaviour (where: 0 = not 
find it at all emotionally hard, is essentially something that would not affect me 
emotionally, 1 = a very weak emotional effect, 2 a weak emotional effect, 3 = some 
emotional effect, 4 = a strong emotional effect, 5 = very strong emotional effect, 6 = 
extremely strong emotional effect) 
We interpret scores in the range zero to 1 to indicate zero-cost and in the range 1 to 2 
to indicate small to minimal cost that is essentially costless, ratings in the range 2 to 4 to 
indicate costly and the range 5 to 6 extremely costly. 
We ordered the behaviors in term of these aggregate scores by mean and mode (Table 
S2). We used the mode to index the normative response. ‘Give someone your car parking 
ticket, for free, when there is still time left on it’ was rated as costless and ‘Donating 20% of 
your salary to charity’, ‘Donating blood regularly’ and ‘Volunteer your time regularly to help 
out at a local charity shop’ as the most costly.  ‘Registering as an organ donor’ to ‘giving 
unwanted clothes or any unwanted toys to charity’ are essentially costless. We also see in 
Table S2 that our interpretation of the factors from Study 1, as costless and costly behaviors, 
is validated in these ratings. 
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Table S2: Ratings of Costly for Prosocial Behavior used in Study 1and their link to the factor structure in Study 1 
 Augmented 
costs ∑(4 
costs)/4 
Traditional 
Costs ∑(3 cost)/3 
Interpretation in Terms of Cost Cost Factor in Study 1 
Donating 20% of your salary to charity 2.73, 1.50 2.80, 2.00 a small amount of time, money, effort, 
weak emotional effect 
Costly Costly Non-Health Prosociality 
Donate blood regularly 2.58. 2.50 2.82, 2.33 a small amount of time, money, effort, 
weak emotional effect 
Costly Costly Health Prosociality: Blood Donation 
Volunteer your time regularly to help out at a 
local charity shop 
2.45. 1.50 2,80, 3.00 a small amount of time, money, effort, 
weak emotional effect 
Costly Costly Non-Health Prosociality 
Donate money to help those you think have 
unfairly lost their jobs 
 1.95, 2.75 2.00, 2.00 a small amount of time, money, effort, 
weak emotional effect 
Costly Costly Non-Health Prosociality 
Register as an organ donor to donate organs 
after your death 
 1.73, 1.50 1.44. 1.33 very little time, money effort, very 
weak emotional effect 
Costless Costless Health and Non-Health Prosociality 
Vote in a general election 1.48, 1.00 1.49, 1.33 very little time, money effort, very 
weak emotional effect 
Costless Costless Health and Non-Health Prosociality 
Give someone a concert ticket for free that 
you can no longer use 
1.43, 0.50 1.27, 0.67 very little time, money effort, very 
weak emotional effect 
Costless Costless Non-Health Prosociality 
Donate blood once            1.33, 0.75 1.35, 1.33 very little time, money effort, very 
weak emotional effect 
Costless Costly Health Prosociality: Blood Donation 
Donate your unwanted clothes to charity 1.31, 0.50 1.44. 0.67 very little time, money effort, very 
weak emotional effect 
Costless Costless Non-Health Prosociality 
Donate any unwanted toys to charity 1.20, 0.50 1.28, .67 very little time, money effort, very 
weak emotional effect 
Costless Costless Non-Health Prosociality 
Sign a petition 1.01, 0.50 0.80. 0.67 No time, money, effort or emotional 
effect 
Zero-Cost Costless Health and Non-Health Prosociality 
Give someone your car parking ticket, for 
free, when there is still time left on it 
0.58. 0.50 0.55, 0.00 No time, money, effort or emotional 
effect 
Zero-Cost Costless Non-Health Prosociality 
Note. Columns 2 and 3 first figure = mean, second = mode 
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Excluded Prosocial Behaviors 
There were nine behaviors assessed that were not specifically designed as key 
indicators of costless and costly prosocial behaviors in that they did not indicate unwanted or 
unneeded resources. We also excluded prosocial behaviors that focus on kin-selection. These 
were included for the purposes of other specific analyses we aim to conduct and to act as 
potential distractor items from the key twelve indicators. These nine behaviors and the 
prosocial constructs they are designed to assess and the rationale for their exclusion are 
provided in Table S3. 
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Table S3. Rationale for Excluding Prosocial Behaviors 
Prosocial Concepts Items Rationale for Exclusion 
Food Poverty  ‘donate food to a food bank’ 
 ‘asking that, food left over 
after a meal out, is donated by 
the restaurant to a homeless 
hostel’ 
The first behavior is ambiguous with respect to the costly-costless distinction as it can reflect either giving 
away unwanted food [costless] or buying food for a food bank appeal [costly]. The second behavior is also 
ambiguous with respect to who is actually making the donation—the customer or the restaurant. 
Whole Body 
Donation 
 ‘donate your body to medical 
science after your death’ 
This item ambiguous with respect to whether or not it was a health or non-health behavior. Unlike organ 
and blood donation where there is a direct effect on another’s health from donation, here the whole body 
donation is likely to be used as a cadaver for medical student training.  
Observable 
Physical Prosocial 
Activity:  
 ‘do a sponsored run to raise 
money for charity’ 
This item was written with different analysis in mind and is ambiguous with respect to cost, which will 
reflect levels of fitness and distance ran. For a very fit, well trained individual, this is virtually costless, but 
for a novice very costly. 
Community 
Prosociality: 
 ‘become a member of a 
neighbourhood watch scheme’ 
Again the exact cost and amount of time involved is unclear.  
Emotional Suport  ‘comfort a grieving friend’ This type of prosocial behavior focuses on helping someone known to the helper, whereas the helping in 
the main paper focuses on helping strangers, as such, the link to relationships is outside the type of act we 
have focused on. Again, cost is ambiguous, as cost depends on the nature of the relationship of the helper 
to the friend (close friend, acquaintance) and the nature of friends’ bereavement (close relative, sudden 
etc.).  
 
 
 
  
Prosocial Concepts Items Rationale for Exclusion 
Genetic 
Relatedness and 
Kin vs Non-Kin 
Prosociality: 
  ‘becoming a living kidney 
donor by donating a kidney to a 
relative’ (to assess kin selection,  
These behaviours were designed to assess the influence of genetic relatedness in terms of kin-selection 
(i.e., inclusive fitness: whereby the helper shows a preferential pattern of helping behaviour toward those 
related to them, such that the related receiver of help benefits at some personal cost to the helper; Nowak,  
2006) versus benefiting a genetically related non-kin individual at a cost to the self; Batson, 1991). 
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 ‘becoming a living kidney donor 
by donating a kidney to a 
stranger’.  
 ‘registering as a bone marrow 
donor’ 
These three items were designed primarily to explore kin-selection and genetic relatedness. Blood 
donation is costly and involves no genetic match, whereas while all three of these are also costly, they 
additionally involve a genetic match, and explicit and implicit kinship links. Indeed, screening information 
to be registered as a marrow donor includes reference to genetic relatedness (see 
https://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/british-bone-marrow-registry/how-can-i-help/).  
Posthumous organ donation is, by contrast, zero-cost and while it includes genetic matching, this is not 
made salient at registration in a way that it is for living organ donation (e.g., 
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/kidney-transplant/#kidney-donations and https://www.odt.nhs.uk/living-
donation/altruistic-kidney-donation/) and bone marrow donation (e.g., http://www.nbta-uk.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/25384-Your-Questions-Answered-A5-Booklet.pdf and 
https://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/).  
So as not to confound costly health helping with kinship and genetic matching, we focused on blood 
donation as the purest aspect of costly health based helping to a stranger (Lyle et al., 2009), however, the 
costly versus costless status of living kidney donation is less clear. For example, donating a kidney to a 
relative may be perceived as costly due to stronger emotional ties and feelings of guilt (Gill & Lowes, 
2008l Show, 2010). This will not be the case for kidney donation to a stranger. 
Thus, for simplicity and similarity across constructs we included blood donation as the marker for costly 
health-based helping and posthumous organ donor as zero-cost health-based helping. As bone marrow and 
living kidney donations go to a stranger we include a sensitivity analyses (see Supplementary Text 3 and 
Table S5) to ensure that excluding these two items did not affect our main results. It did not. 
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Supplementary Text S2: Adaptation of CFA Model 5 
Model 5 from the analysis reported in the main paper was the best fit to these data. 
The factor loadings for this model are shown in Table S4. 
As can be seen in Table S4 all the health behaviors load significantly on the health 
factor and non-health behaviors on the non-health factor. However, for the factor representing 
high cost helping, the behaviors assessing high cost health helping (blood donation) did not 
load significantly on that factor. Similarly, the behaviors referring to donating ‘unwanted 
clothes’ or ‘toys’ to charity and, ‘giving someone a free concert ticket’, did not significantly 
load on the low cost factor. This suggests that the blood donation may represent a high cost 
health factor of its own. Also, low cost helping may be represented two factors. One 
representing signing a petition, voting, being in the organ donor register and, giving away a 
car parking ticket. These behaviors loaded together and organ donation has a higher loading 
on this costless helping factor than the health factor. This combination of behaviors 
represents low cost helping around communal and civic duty. A second costless factor may 
be represented by giving unwanted clothes or toys to charity and giving someone a free 
concert ticket, as these behaviors do not load on the costless helping factor.  
Supplementary File 
50 
 
Table S4. CFA factor loadings and Latent factor inter-correlations for Model 5 
Behaviors 
Factors 
C CL H NH 
Donate blood once -.160 .000 .773 .000 
Donate blood regularly -.010 .000 .858 .000 
Donating 20% of your salary to charity .549 .000 .000 .251 
Donate money to help those you think have unfairly lost their 
jobs 
.697 .000 .000 .375 
Volunteer your time regularly to help out at a local charity 
shop 
.338 .000 .000 .157 
Register as an organ donor to donate organs after your death .000 .608 .308 .000 
Sign a petition .000 .441 .000 .431 
Vote in a general election .000 . 685 .000 .337 
Donate your unwanted clothes to charity .000 . 124 .000 .818 
Give someone a concert ticket for free that you can no longer 
use 
.000 -.029 .000 .558 
Donate any unwanted toys to charity .000 -.050 .000 .722 
Give someone your car parking ticket, for free, when there is 
still time left on it 
.000 .405 .000 .403 
Correlations across latent factors  
  Factor 1:  Costly  1    
  Factor 2: Costless -.432 1   
  Factor 3: Health  .000 .000 1  
  Factor 4: Non- Health .000 .000 .381 1 
 
Note. C = Costly; CL = Costless; H = Health; NH = Non-health. Coefficients in bold 
indicate significant loadings and significant inter-correlations. Coefficients at .000 were 
fixed to equal .000. 
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Supplementary Text S3: Sensitivity Analysis for Study 1 
We decided to adopt a strict item exclusion criteria around item assessing behaviors 
linked to living kidney donation to a stranger and bone marrow donation. Therefore, we 
conducted a sensitivity analysis to check that the results we report in Study 1 in the main 
paper are not affected by our decisions to not include these two altruistic health helping 
items. We thus added an additional factor (Factor 5) to the final model specified in the main 
paper (Model 6), to reflect behaviors linked directly to genetically-related living donation of 
human tissue to a stranger. While this model was a reasonable fit to these data (CFI = .84, 
TLI = .88, RMSEA = .08) modification indices indicated that this would be improved by 
adding a cross loading such that ‘becoming a bone marrow donor’ also loaded on Factor 4  
(Costless Community and Civic Duty Focused Prosociality) along with posthumous organ 
donation (CFI = .93, TLI = .91, RMSEA = .06). This indicates that becoming a bone marrow 
donor, while linked to living donation to a genetically related stranger, is also likely to be 
perceived as costless, at the point of the decision to join the register, much like posthumous 
organ donation. Living kidney donation to a stranger, however, does not cross-load and 
remains as a costly prosocial health behaviour. Furthermore, it also indicates that our main 
analyses and conclusions are not a consequence of our strict decision to leave these items out.
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Table S5. CFA factor loadings and Latent factor inter-correlations for adapted Model 6 
Behaviors 
Factors  
1 2 3 4 5 
Donate your unwanted clothes to charity .928 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Give someone a concert ticket for free that you can no longer 
use 
.553 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Donate any unwanted toys to charity .677 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Donating 20% of your salary to charity .000 .615 .000 .000 .000 
Donate money to help those you think have unfairly lost their 
jobs 
.000 .738 .000 .000 .000 
Volunteer your time regularly to help out at a local charity 
shop 
.000 .435 .000 .000 .000 
Donate blood once .000 .000 .744 .000 .000 
Donate blood regularly .000 .000 .899 .000 .000 
Give someone your car parking ticket, for free, when there is 
still time left on it 
.000 .000 .000 .589 .000 
Register as an organ donor to donate organs after your death .000 .000 .000 .600 .000 
Sign a petition .000 .000 .000 .625 .000 
Vote in a general election .000 .000 .000 .663 .000 
Become  a living kidney donor, by donating a kidney to a 
stranger 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .830 
Register as a bone marrow donor .000 .000 .000 .460 .568 
Correlations across latent factors   
  Factor 1: Costless Non-Health Prosociality 1     
  Factor 2: Costly Non-Health Prosociality .380 1    
  Factor 3: Costly Health Prosociality: Blood Donation .273 .121 1   
 Factor 4: Costless Communal and Civic Duty .511 -.099 .435 1  
 Factor 5: Genetically linked Altruistic Health Donation -.110 .520 .378 -.013 1 
 
Note. Coefficients in bold indicate significant loadings and significant inter-correlations. 
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Supplementary Text S4: Instructions for Economic Games 
Full description (narrative) generosity game 
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Full description (narrative) dictator game 
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Decomposed generosity game 
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Decomposed dictator game 
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Supplementary Text S5: Analyses Across Samples 
Organ Donor Behavior: Results Across the 4 Samples 
Across all 4 samples (Table S6) organ donor behavior is consistently positively 
associated with GG allocations, such that those who express being an organ donor give more 
on the GG, with this marginal only in sample 4 (p < .10). Thus, the picture for each sample is 
consistent with the aggregated analyses in the main paper. With respect to DG allocations the 
non-significant association reported in the main text, with no association in samples 2, 3 and, 
4 which is consistent with the aggregate analysis in the main paper, however, inconsistently 
there is a positive association in sample 1. However, sample 1 had the smallest N of 70, with 
such small sample sizes can come the possibility that a significant effect does not represent a 
true significant association (Button, Ioannidis, Mokrysz, Nosek, Flint, Robinson & Munarfo, 
2013). 
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Table S6. Associations between GG and DG Allocations and Organ Donor Behavior 
 Dictator Game  Generosity Game  
 Tobit OLS Tobit OLS 
Sample 1 (N = 70) B (95%CI) B (95%CI) B (95%CI) B (95%CI) 
Organ Donor 5.62*  
(0.91, 10.32) 
1.55*  
(0.38, 2.73) 
7.85**  
(2.36, 13.35) 
2.54** 
(0.83, 4.25) 
Sex 3.45  
(-0.65, 7.56) 
0.81 
(-0.28, 1.89) 
3.04 
(-1.10, 7.18) 
1.15 
(-0.42, 2.73)  
R2 .04 .11 .04 .13 
Sample 2 (N=301)     
Organ Donor -0.31 
(-0.64, 0.02) 
-0.29^ 
(-0.61, 0.02) 
1.41*** 
(0.51, 2.30) 
0.93** 
(0.34, 1.53) 
Sex 0.15 
(-0.16, 0.46) 
0.14 
(-0.15, 0.44) 
-1.46** 
(-2.32, -0.60) 
-0.94** 
(-1.51, -0.38) 
R2 .004 .01 .01 .06 
Sample 3 (N=102)     
Organ Donor 0.41 
(-0.29, 1.10) 
0.38 
(-0.27, 1.03) 
1.17* 
(0.06, 2.29) 
0.95* 
(0.04, 1.87) 
Sex 0.24 
(-0.48, 0.97) 
0.22 
(-0.46, 0.90) 
-1.04 
(-2.22, 0.12) 
-0.82 
(-1.78, 0.14) 
R2 .005 0.21 .01 .06 
Sample 4 (N=256)     
Organ Donor -0.26 
(-1.07, 0.55) 
-0.16 
(-0.72, 0.39) 
1.19^^ 
(-0.21, 2.59) 
0.56 
(-0.15, 1.27) 
Sex 1.08** 
(0.26,  1.90) 
0.75* 
(0.18, 1.31) 
-2.64*** 
(-4.07, -1.22) 
-1.30** 
(-0.202, -0.59) 
R2 .006 .03 .01 .05 
Note ^^ p < .10, ^p < .07, * p =< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001:. Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female; Organ: 0 = non-organ 
donor, 1 = organ donor. 
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Charity/Volunteer Behavior: Results Across the 4 Samples 
Across the 4 samples (Table S7) there were no associations between charity/volunteer 
identity and GG allocations, which is consistent with the results reported in the aggregate 
analyses in the main paper. The positive association with the DG reported in the aggregate 
data was less consistent and observed in samples 2 and 4, which are the studies with the 
larger Ns. The two samples (samples 1 and 3) with the smallest Ns show the non-significant 
associations, which may reflect a lack of power.  
References 
Button, K. S., Ioannidis,  J. P. A., Mokrysz, C., Nosek, B. A., Flint, J., Robinson, E. 
S.J.,  & Munarfo, M. R. (2013).   Power failure: why small sample size undermines the 
reliability of neuroscience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14, 365-376. Doi. 
10.1038/nrn3475
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Table S7. Associations between GG and DG Allocations and Charity/Volunteer Behavior 
 Dictator Game  Generosity Game  
 Tobit OLS Tobit OLS 
Sample 1 (N = 69) B (95%CI) B (95%CI) B (95%CI) B (95%CI) 
Charity/Volunteer -0.49 
(-1.44, 0.45) 
-0.15 
(-0.42, 0.11) 
-0.13 
(-1.14, 0.89) 
-0.08 
(-0.48, 0.32) 
Sex 2.53 
(-1.54, 6.61) 
0.62 
(-0.52, 1.76) 
1.68 
(-2.68, 6.03) 
0.72 
(-0.98, 2.42) 
R2 .010 .03 .002 .01 
Sample 2 (N=301)     
Charity/Volunteer 0.10** 
(0.03, 0.17) 
0.09** 
(0.02, 0.16) 
0.06 
(-0.14, 0.26) 
0.04 
(-0.10, 0.17) 
Sex 0.10 
(-0.21, 0.41) 
0.10 
(-0.19, 0.39) 
-1.43** 
(-2.30, -0.55) 
-0.92** 
(-1.49, -0.35) 
R2 .007 .02 .008 .03 
Sample 3 (N=102)     
Charity/Volunteer 0.09 
(-.08, 0.27) 
0.09 
(-0.08, 0.25) 
0.26^ 
(-0.01, 0.54) 
.0.22^ 
(-0.01, 0.45) 
Sex 0.31 
(-0.41,  1.03) 
0.29 
(-0.39, 0.96) 
-0.85 
(-2.01, 0.30) 
-0.66 
(-1.61, 0.29) 
R2 .005 .02 .012 .05 
Sample 4 (N=256)     
Charity/Volunteer 0.22* 
(0.02, 0.42) 
0.15* 
(0.01, 0.29) 
0.20 
(-0.15, 0.55) 
0.11 
(-0.06, 0.29) 
Sex 0.83^ 
(-0.008, 1.67) 
0.57^ 
(-0.004, 1.15) 
-2.79*** 
(-4.26, -1.31) 
-1.40*** 
(-2.14, -0.66) 
R2 .010 .04 .014 .05 
Note . ^^ p < .10 ^p < .07, * p =< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001: Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female.
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Supplementary Text S6: Effects of Sex, Incentivization and their Interaction 
Effects of Sex, Incentives and Sample.  
Tables 5a and 5b (main text) indicated a number of interesting effects for sex, 
incentivisation, and sample type. 
Effect of Sex. Specifically, men give more in the GG (Means: MUsmale = 7.2 vs 
MUsfemale = 6.2), and women in the DG (Means: MUsmale = 3.6 vs MUsfemale = 4.20.  
Men consistently allocated more than women in the (costless) GG while women 
allocated more than men in the (costly) DG. Although these results were unpredicted and 
were not the primary focus of this research, they replicated previous findings on gender and 
social preferences. Several studies have shown that women are more prosocial in simple DG, 
while men are more prosocial when the cost of giving is lowered or when giving or 
cooperating maximizes efficiency (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; 
Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Kuhn & Villeval, 2015).  
These differences may arise from evolutionary differences in reproductive strategies, 
specifically, the accumulation of economic resources and status for male, rather than female, 
reproductive success (Sidanius et al., 2000). Similarly, the literature on costly signaling in 
mate selection indicates that men may engage in acts of conspicuous consumption as a 
display of resources to increase prestige and status (Griskevicius et al., 2007). In the current 
study, this may expressed through costless allocations of money in the GG, which does not 
one’s actual stakes at risk is through costless allocations in the generosity game 
Effects of Incentives. Compared with hypothetical scenarios, incentivisation 
enhances GG allocations (Means: MUsincentives = 7.1 vs MUshypothetical = 6.3) but reduces DG 
allocations (Means: MUsincentives = 3.0 vs MUshypothetical = 4.6).  
Some behavioral economists have challenged the external validity of decision making studies 
when tasks have no ‘salient’ material rewards. They argue that, without such incentives, 
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participants may not be adequately motivated to behave as they would in the field (Ariely & 
Norton, 2007; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). While psychologists have criticised this for being 
overly simplistic (e.g., Read, 2005), it is still a potentially pertinent critique for the lab. 
Indeed, effects of incentives are clearly seen in the present findings.  
Without the trade-off between players’ payoffs, it was predicted that players would 
allocate more to their partners in the GG than the DG (Güth, 2010) and this was indeed the 
case in incentivized games but not the hypothetical scenarios. Thus, it may be argued that 
incentives motivate players to play ‘as if’ in the real world (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). 
However, it should be acknowledged that in both incentivized games the players play with 
‘house money’ (Clark, 2002). That is, the money is given to each player i.e. they did not have 
to earn it. When players have to earn money, giving is reduced (see Cherry, Frykblom & 
Shogren, 2002). This may explain why DG giving is reduced compared to the hypothetical 
scenario. Based on house-money effects it is a reasonable conjecture that in the DG game this 
may be an under-estimations of selfishness, with reduced giving when money is earned. In 
the GG the greater generosity observed with house money might be an over-estimate and 
again reduced if the money were earned initially. It would be interesting to examine whether 
the same predicted distinction would emerge if players earned the money first.  
Incentives by sample. The interactions for incentives by sample (Figure S1) indicates 
that students give less in the GG than the community sample in the absence of incentives and 
less in the DG when it is incentivized. However, this is treated with caution as it was not a 
main focus of this study, or hypothesized. Also the student and community samples differ in 
many ways (occupation, ethnicity, age etc.), all of which may account for the differences. As 
such we report this for the interested reader. 
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Figure S1. Interactions of Games (generosity or dictator) by Incentives and Samples 
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